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“Friendship we believe to be the greatest good of 
states and what best preserves them against 
revolutions.” (Politics II 4, 1262b7-9)1 
 
 
Abstract: Aristotle’s portrait of the man of great soul (ho megalopsychos) in both the Eudemian 
and the Nicomachean Ethics has long perplexed commentators.  Although his portrait of the man 
of small soul (ho mikropsychos) has been all but ignored by commentators, it, too, contains a 
number of claims that are profoundly counter-intuitive to the modern cast of mind.  The paper is 
an attempt at identifying the nature of the discrepancies between Aristotle’s values and our own, 
and at placing the ethical claims that he makes on greatness and smallness of soul within the 
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context of his ethics and political philosophy.  The Aristotelian man of great-soul, it is here 
contended, is best understood as a man who assesses external and internal goods, both his own and 
those of others, at their true value.  His overall excellence fits him to play a key political role, not 
only in states where the principle of distributive justice dictates that the best should rule, but also 
in states with a democratic constitution, in which citizens take it in turn to rule and be ruled.  He 
is therefore paradigmatically capable of engaging in civic friendship, a relationship that Aristotle 
left largely undefined in spite of holding it to be a powerfully cohesive force in the state. The man 
of small-soul, by contrast, is best understood as a man whose disinclination to take risks of any 
kind makes him reluctant to contribute to the well-being of his city and who, as a result, proves 
incapable of engaging in civic friendship.  
 
Introduction 
Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship has recently benefited from a good deal of scholarly attention.  
While such renewal of interest, which comes after centuries of neglect, has shed new light on some 
of the puzzles already identified by the ancient commentators, it has also thrown up fresh cruces 
and complexities. At one end of the spectrum are the many scholars who, in the second half of last 
century, sought to identify the nature of the relationship between the three forms of friendship 
distinguished in the Ethics.  In so doing, these scholars have taken up and developed a question 
that had already been formulated in the second century AD when Aspasius the Peripatetic asked 
whether the friendship of virtue, the friendship of utility and the friendship of pleasure are related 
analogously or by virtue of the focal meaning that Aristotle ascribed to the friendship of virtue.2  
At the other end of the spectrum are the scholars who, more recently, have probed the meaning of 
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Aristotle’s definition of virtue friendship as “other selfhood” or who have taken position on the 
vexed question as to whether Aristotelian eudaimonism can be described as a form of ethical 
egoism.3  At the heart of these questions are concepts such as self, egoism and altruism, which had 
no currency in antiquity or had a very different meaning from the one they came to acquire later.  
To avoid projecting modern meanings on ancient concepts, therefore, scholars interested in 
questions of this latter kind must be clear as to how and why the key notions in which Aristotle 
expressed his views differed from their own.  Only so can they hope to mine his ethical insights 
for all their considerable worth.  
The present essay is concerned with questions of this second kind.  Taking friendship as my 
focus, I shall address two clusters of question.  Turning first to Aristotle’s paragon of virtue, the 
great-souled man (ho megalopsychos),4 I shall ask whether, or to what extent, his many excellences 
prepare him for engaging in friendship at both the personal and the civic level.  Is his virtuous self-
sufficiency so great as to make the formation of personal ties redundant?  Can he be counted upon 
to engage readily in the association that Aristotle calls “civic friendship” (politikē philia)?  Turning 
then to the mysterious character whom Aristotle describes as the small-souled man (ho 
mikropsychos), I shall ask why he is presented as vicious and, more specifically, why he is held to 
be a potential source of harm to the state.  Both sets of questions have mostly been ignored by 
ancient and modern commentators alike, eager to turn to what they perceived to be weightier 
matters in the master’s Ethics.  In this, as I hope to show, they were mistaken.  Aristotle famously 
tells us on more than one occasion that “friendship ... seems to hold states together, and lawgivers 
apparently devote more attention to it than to justice.”5  This being so, we need to understand why 
he considered that the great-souled man, for all his aloofness, is nonetheless an asset to the state.  
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Correspondingly, we need to understand why he held that the vice of the small-souled man, whose 
civic dimension is far from being immediately apparent, involves a failure of friendship and 
responsible citizenship.     
These are not easy questions to deal with.  Not only is Aristotle’s description of mikropsychia 
(literally: smallness of soul) terse in the extreme, but it also comes as a corollary of his analysis of 
the most elusive and most misunderstood of all the virtues listed in the Ethics, namely 
megalopsychia (literally: greatness of soul).  The absence of any ready equivalent in our modern 
vernaculars for either the virtue of megalopsychia or the vice of mikropsychia suggests that, as far 
as modern readers are concerned, Aristotle’s characterization of mikropsychia as a vicious 
deficiency of megalopsychia is truly a case of explaining the obscure by the more obscure.     
In an attempt to overcome the exegetical and philosophical difficulties involved in coming to 
terms with these twin dispositions of character, I shall proceed as follows.  In section 1, I shall 
offer some introductory remarks on the difficulties that Aristotle’s translators encounter in 
rendering the two concepts into modern vernaculars.  If nothing else, a survey of their largely 
unsuccessful efforts will begin to give us a sense of the conceptual territory covered by the 
Aristotelian notions.  In section 2, I shall briefly sketch what I take to be those features of 
megalopsychia that make it most likely to contribute to the realization of the end of the city-state, 
as Aristotle conceived it.  In section 3, I shall turn to the political dimensions of megalopsychia 
and show how, in Aristotle’s viewpoint, a megalopsychos is likely to be the source of considerable 
benefits to both his friends and his city.  Section 4 will be devoted to an analysis of Aristotle’s 
definition of mikropsychia and of his claim that, in contrast with megalopsychia, it is incompatible 
with both the best kind of friendship and an optimal level of civic engagement.  In section 5 I shall 
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offer some brief remarks on the normative gap that separates Aristotle’s concept of pride from 
ours.   
 
1. A translator’s  headache: megalopsychia and mikropsychia  
In the fourth book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines “megalopsychia” as the virtue of 
the “man who thinks he deserves great things and actually does deserve them.”6  A page later he 
writes that megalopsychia is the “crown of the virtues” in so far as “it magnifies them and cannot 
exist without them.”7  Taken together, the two statements have long been a source of perplexity for 
Aristotle’s later readers, most of whom were brought up in one or the other of the Abrahamic 
religions.  As is well-known, these religions teach that pride is a sin and the proud man “an 
abomination to the Lord”.  Unlike Aristotle, who viewed the megalopsychos’ keen awareness of 
his merit as an integral part of his virtue, these religions discourage the faithful from dwelling on 
their own deserts and attainments.8  It should therefore come as no surprise that, from the Middle-
Ages onwards, translators found megalopsychia, with the commendatory connotations that it has 
in Aristotle’s usage, well nigh impossible to render into Latin or their own vernacular.   
Of the most common renderings of megalopsychia - “pride”, “magnanimity”, “high-
mindedness”, “great-soulness” and “great-heartedness” - none is semantically close enough to the 
Aristotelian concept while also carrying its highly commendatory connotations.  Least acceptable 
of all is “pride”.9  Not only has it become too negatively connotated to enable modern readers to 
understand how Aristotle could hold it to be the crown of the virtues, it is also the traditional 
rendering of superbia, the Latin word by which medieval commentators rendered Aristotle’s name 
for the vicious excess of megalopsychia, namely chaunotēs.  “Magnanimity”,10 which is an exact 
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rendering of the Greek via the Latin magnanimitas, tends nowadays to denote the virtue of those 
who are disposed to overlook the slights and offenses of which they may have been the object.  As 
such, “magnanimity” lacks the cognitive import that lies at the very core of Aristotelian 
megalopsychia.  “High-mindedness”11 sounds an archaic note.  Furthermore, in so far as it has 
long denoted the state of one who is generally “high-principled” or “moral” (in the modern sense 
of the word), it is too vague to convey the very specific virtuous disposition that Aristotle classifies 
under the name of megalopsychia in both versions of the Ethics.  Attempts at literal renderings of 
the Greek, such as “greatness of spirit”12 and “greatness of soul”13 have no resonance for modern 
readers, and do not, therefore, serve their needs any better than would a mere transliteration of 
Aristotle’s own word.  As for “great-heartedness”14, it is too close to “big-heartedness” to be a 
possible contender since it tends nowadays to characterize the generosity of those whose response 
to appeals on behalf of victims of natural disasters is immediate and pre-reflective.  As will 
presently be seen, the generosity of Aristotle’s megalopsychos is of a different kind.   
Aristotelian mikropsychia is almost as alien to modern mentalities as megalopsychia.  In so far 
as Aristotle holds it to be a culpable (psektos) disposition of character which leads people to under-
assess their capabilities and merits,15 it, too, runs counter to the moral intuitions of readers of the 
Ethics brought up in any one of the Abrahamic religions.  What could be morally worthier, their 
religiously-based intuitions intimate, than to refrain from proclaiming one’s own merit and from 
actively seeking to reap one’s due rewards?  Admittedly, there is some resemblance between 
Aristotelian mikropsychia and the modern psychological concept of “low self-esteem.”16  But the 
resemblance is no more than skin-deep: while the Aristotelian concept denotes a moral vice for 
which one is to be blamed, the modern-day concept denotes a psychological dysfunction for which 
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one is to be pitied or even, in some extreme cases, offered treatment.  Furthermore, while 
Aristotelian mikropsychia affects only men of substance who shy away from the kind of civic 
engagement that is part and parcel of a life well lived, as objectively conceived, low self-esteem is 
a condition that can affect anyone and stands in the way of self-fulfillment and happiness, as 
subjectively conceived.   
Such discrepancy between Aristotle’s viewpoint and later intuitions has caused mikropsychia, 
like megalopsychia, to fare badly at the hands of his translators.  Of all the renderings to be found 
in currently available translations of the Ethics - from pusillanimity to humility - none successfully 
conveys the meaning and the connotations of the Greek concept.  “Pusillanimity”17, the Latinized 
equivalent of mikropsychia (pusillus animus), once the standard rendering of mikropsychia in 
English, is now almost obsolete.  Although, like the Greek word, it does denote excessive timidity, 
it fails to convey what, in Aristotle’s outlook, stands at the vicious core of mikropsychia, namely 
lack of self-knowledge.  “Small-mindedness”18 denotes a preoccupation with petty, narrow-
minded, concerns rather than the cognitive failing that Aristotle identifies as the root of 
mikropsychia.  As for “small-soulness”,19 “little-soulness”20 and weak-heartedness21, they have no 
ready meaning at all for modern readers and set no barrier, therefore, to the construal of 
mikropsychia as “modesty” or even “humility”.  As will presently be shown, such construal is the 
most misleading of all since it actively invites the anachronistic projection of religiously-grounded 
notions onto a philosophy to which they are profoundly alien.22  
To guard against all such assumptions and misapprehensions I shall here leave untranslated both 
megalopsychia and mikropsychia.  Although this may well be taken to be a counsel of despair, it 
has the advantage of setting no semantic barrier between Aristotle and ourselves. 
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2. Megalopsychia and self-knowledge 
Aristotle’s definition of megalopsychia as “the crown of the virtues”,23 together with his 
characterization of the megalopsychos as “a man who thinks he deserves great things and actually 
does deserve them” (N.E. 1123b1-2), entail that there is in his view an objective ratio of public 
recognition (or honor) to individual desert, and that the megalopsychos correctly surmises that, in 
his own case, the ratio is particularly high.  His specific virtue, which is also the highest point of 
virtue, is therefore made up of two elements, exceptional merit and accurate self-assessment.  
These will now be taken in turn.   
“Crown of the virtues” is, on the face of it, a curious expression to use on the part of a 
philosopher who holds a unitary theory of the virtues.  Since, according to this theory, one person 
cannot have some virtues while lacking others, and anyone possessing one virtue also possesses 
all the others, the question arises as to why there should be a “crown” of the virtues and, if there 
be occasion for one, why it should go to megalopsychia.  The answer, as inferred from the text of 
both Ethics, is that the crown-like status of megalopsychia is grounded in its necessary association 
with greatness (megethos, N.E. 1223b8) and nobility (kalokagathia, E.E., 1249a16).  The link 
between megalopsychia and kalokagathia, which is but tenuous in the Nicomachean version, is 
the object of a helpful, though compressed, argument in the Eudemian version.  Kalokagathia, 
Aristotle there explains, is “perfect virtue” (aretē teleios); it is the virtue of a man for whom the 
things that are good by nature are “fine” and valuable in and for themselves (ta kala di’ hauta), 
rather than solely for their consequences.  Since wealth, birth and power enable such a man to 
perform actions that are both advantageous and fine (sympheronta kai kala),24 it is just that these 
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goods of nature should be his.  As Aristotle will have further occasions to argue in the Politics, 
“what is just (dikaion) is fine, and what is according to worth (kat’ axian) is just.”25  In performing 
fine and advantageous actions, therefore, the Aristotelian kalokagathos or megalopsychos shows 
himself worthy of the incidental advantages that nature and circumstances have bestowed upon 
him.  He is therefore in a position to lead the best human life possible, namely a “life of excellence, 
when excellence has external goods enough for the performance of good actions.”26  Modern 
readers of Aristotle, of course, will point out that, given the nature of the incidental conditions that 
he takes to be necessary for the possession of megalopsychia, it is unlikely that it could ever be 
practised by more than a handful of individuals at any one time.  Women,27 slaves,28 resident 
aliens,29 the unintelligent, the less than wealthy, and those whose achievements fell short of the 
highest, could not realistically aspire to it in 4th century Athens, however great their merits and 
determined their efforts.  The unpalatable conclusion, therefore, appears unavoidable that Aristotle 
restricted the achievement of the crown of the virtues to the aristocratic rich. 
A careful reading of the text of the Nicomachean version, however, reveals that the conclusion 
is not quite as unpalatable as it might appear at first glance since Aristotle presents the possession 
of such incidental advantages as wealth and high birth as necessary, as opposed to sufficient, 
conditions of megalopsychia.  To these necessary conditions, he added another one, namely that, 
in order to be worthy of wearing the crown of the virtues, a wealthy nobleman needs also to be 
consistently disposed to perform the fine actions that circumstances call for, and to confer upon 
the state and his fellow citizens the high benefits that his position enables him to confer.  No one, 
Aristotle takes care to add, can lay claim to the virtue of megalopsychia who does not fulfill both 
conditions: “whoever possesses the goods of fortune without possessing excellence or virtue is not 
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justified in claiming great deserts for himself, nor is it correct to call him a megalopsychos, for 
neither is possible without perfect virtue.”30  In so far as the megalopsychos’ entitlement to civic 
recognition and honors is conditional upon the fulfilllment of this latter, moral, condition, he is 
within striking distance - surprisingly so - of the faithful servant of the synoptic gospels: “to whom 
much is given, of him much will be required.”31  
Other aspects of Aristotle’s account of megalopsychia have proved more difficult to reconcile 
with our moral intuitions.  One such is the claim that it is characteristic of the megalopsychos to 
be fully aware of the extent of his merit and achievements.  While no commentator has disputed 
that the ability to take the measure of one’s own worth is to be esteemed in proportion to its rarity, 
many have resisted Aristotle’s claim that it is a moral virtue.  Far more virtuous it is to be aware 
of one’s limitations than of one’s merits, goes a long-standing and widespread view.  Holding such 
a view, modern commentators have mostly been united in expressing their dismay at Aristotle’s 
commendation of the megalopsychos for his keen awareness of the extent of his deserts.  So put 
out, for example, were Burnet and Joachim by the portrait of the megalopsychos drawn in the 
Ethics that they could not believe that Aristotle had meant it in earnest; it was, they conjectured, 
quietly “humorous”, “half-ironical,”32 or obviously exaggerated.33  Rather than seeking to provide 
a detailed account of this particular difference between Aristotle and ourselves - a task that would 
far exceed the space available in this volume - I shall here, more modestly, try to make Aristotle’s 
position appear less distasteful to those who regard pride as a vice (or a sin) and modesty (or 
humility) as a virtue.  Accordingly, I shall now proceed to outline the cognitive excellences that 
enable the megalopsychos to take a just measure of his merit and, on that basis, to accept, 
graciously if not enthusiastically, whatever high civic honors come his way. 
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The self-knowledge that an Aristotelian megalopsychos needs to have in order to be worthy of 
the name goes far beyond the particularities of his own person and situation.  To begin with, he 
must have a secure grasp of the standards and criteria by which merit happens to be assessed in his 
city; only so will he be able to measure his attainments against his capabilities and to compare both 
with those of his peers.  More crucially, however, he must have an understanding of the standards 
and criteria by which it is right and proper that merit should be measured; only so will he be able, 
not only to keep his own standards of excellence independent of local contingencies, but also to 
value in himself and his friends what is most truly valuable.  In Aristotelian terms this means that 
the megalopsychos must identify himself with his thinking element (nous), on the understanding, 
whether explicit or not, that “the thinking element is what each of us mostly is” (N.E., 1168b34-
5), and that it behoves us, therefore, to cultivate and promote it over all others.  Truly to have 
identified himself with his nous and become a megalopsychos, such a character will therefore have 
had to nurture the thinking element in himself and trained his appetitive and emotional drives into 
habits of easy compliance with it.  If such self-training has been successful, the megalopsychos 
will, in all relevant circumstances, consistently choose the good of his soul in preference to all 
external goods.  This will make him a self-lover (philautos) in Aristotle’s commendatory sense of 
the word, namely someone who “loves and gratifies the most sovereign element in him” (ibid., 
1168b33-34) and “obeys it in everything” (ibid., 1168b31).  The megalopsychos’ self-knowledge, 
it can now be concluded, is of a virtuous nature since it gives him, beyond the certainty of his own 
worth, the assurance that his life is consistently governed by the element in him that is best suited 
to rule.34    
Whether the megalopsychos’ correct understanding of the end of human life be theoretical35 or 
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practical,36 one thing is certain: it consistently informs his deliberations in matters related to his 
personal and civic life.  Amongst these, honor and public recognition figure more prominently than 
we would expect, and the question will presently have to be asked as to why Aristotle should have 
assigned honor such a significant role in the life of the megalopsychos.  For the moment let us 
simply note that, having classified honor as “the greatest external good” (N.E., 1123b20-21),37 he 
proceeds to claim that it is entirely proper for the megalopsychos, not only to strive after such 
honors as his merit warrants (N.E., 1123b19), but also to be chagrined at being denied them (E.E., 
1232b12-3).  This, however, does not mean that the megalopsychos’ attitude to honor is one of 
anxious concern.  Far from it.  Aware that honor depends as much upon luck and the opinion of 
those who have it in their gift as it does upon the merits of the recipient, the megalopsychos regards 
it as an external good unfit to play more than a minor role in the best life for a human being to 
lead.  Thus he disdains the small and ill-judged honors bestowed upon him by the unthinking 
many38 and, although he is moderately pleased at being the object of the highest honors, he yet 
knows better than to attach undue importance to them: 
From great honors and those that good people confer upon him he will derive a 
moderate (cf. metriōs) amount of pleasure, convinced that he is only getting what is 
properly his or even less.  For no honor can be worthy of perfect virtue.  Yet he will 
accept such honors, because they have no greater tribute to pay to him. (N.E., 1124a5-
9, tr. Ostwald, modified) 
As can be seen, therefore, virtue has distanced the Aristotelian megalopsychos from worldly 
success, wealth and power, all of which are for most men objects of anxious concern.  Not being 
at the mercy of fortune and the opinion of others, the megalopsychos has made himself as self-
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sufficient as a human being can be. 
Does this mean that his self-sufficiency is so complete that he has no reason or need to engage 
in friendship?  Indeed not.  Besides holding that human self-sufficiency cannot ever be such as to 
preclude the need for friendship,39 Aristotle gives us clear grounds in both versions of the Ethics 
and in the Politics for thinking that his paragon of virtue, far from remaining aloof from the affairs 
of men, has an important political role to play in the city, and that he readily engages in friendship 
at both the civic and the personal level.  Let us see how.   
 
3. Megalopsychia and Civic Friendship  
a. The end of the city-state 
In book I of the Politics Aristotle summarily restates his teleological conception of human nature.  
Human beings, he teaches, cannot achieve self-sufficiency on their own or in isolation; they need 
a social context in which to grow to maturity and develop their power of reason.  This is why 
nature, which does nothing without a purpose or in vain,40 has implanted in human beings a social 
instinct.41  This instinct prompts them, in the first place, to form communities (koinōniai), such as 
households and villages, with the immediate purpose of securing for themselves the “bare 
necessities of life.”  Once a community, or group of communities, has grown materially self-
sufficient or very nearly so, it evolves into a polis or sovereign city-state in which “the limit of 
self-sufficiency” is attained (Pol. I 2, 1252b29).  In Aristotle’s outlook the city-state is the optimal 
political unit, being inclusive enough to be self-sufficient, but not so large as to make it impossible 
for the citizens to know each other by reputation, if not personally. Mutual acquaintance, he held, 
breeds mutual confidence (pistis pros allēlous) and instills in the citizens a desirable sense of 
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community.  So much is evident, he pointed out, from the fact that tyrants, who must divide in 
order to rule, “take every means to prevent people from knowing one another”42 and, for that 
reason, forbid the practice of meals in common (sussitiai) and the formation of clubs and 
fellowships (hetairiai).  Precisely because Aristotle wanted the citizens to know each other and to 
interact in leisure as in work, he favored the custom of taking meals in common for the 
opportunities it provided for the discussion of topics of mutual interest.43  Although, surprisingly 
enough, the issue of civic friendship is hardly ever broached in the Politics, Aristotle’s insistence 
on the desirability of social and educational interaction between the citizens would seem to justify 
Richard Kraut’s conclusion that Aristotle “sees common meals as a way of fostering civic 
friendship.”44     
From the a priori anthropological considerations offered in the opening remarks of the Politics, 
Aristotle concluded that the state is obviously (cf. phaneron) a creation of nature and that human 
beings are political animals by nature.45  He did not, however, stop there and proceeded to draw 
from his conception of the state and human sociality as “natural” the norm which lies at the very 
foundation of his ethics and political philosophy.  The city-state (polis), he taught, being the 
completion or end (telos) of associations formed for the sake of survival and self-sufficiency, is 
the best form of political association; it alone provides humans beings with the conditions in which 
they can flourish and lead the best possible human life.  To the realization of this end, friendship, 
as created by associations of various kinds between the citizens, plays an important part.  As we 
read in a characteristically dense passage:  
 It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established 
for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are the 
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conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute 
a state, which is a community of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and 
self-sufficing life.  Such a community can only be established among those who live 
in the same place and intermarry.  Hence there arise in cities connexions, brotherhoods, 
common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together.  But these are created by 
friendship, for to choose to live together is friendship.  The end of a state is the good 
life, and these are the means towards it.  And the state is the union of families and 
villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable 
life.  Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, 
and not of living together.  Hence they who contribute most to such a society have a 
larger share in it (tēs poleōs metesti pleion) than those who have the same or a greater 
freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political excellence (cf. tēn 
politikēn aretēn); or than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them 
in excellence. (Pol. III 9, 1280b33-40) 
Aristotle here highlights two factors that contribute to the realization of the end of the polis: 
friendship between the citizens and compliance with the principle of distributive justice that 
dictates that those best qualified to hold political office should be given a share in the government 
of the city commensurate with their ability.   
b. Egalitarian and aristocratic constitutions 
While the promotion of civic friendship is entirely consonant with Aristotle’s conception of the 
state as a relatively compact community aiming at a self-sufficing and good life, the application of 
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the principle of distributive justice, as alluded to in the above lines, runs counter to the egalitarian 
conception of the state that Aristotle defends elsewhere in the Politics, when he claims that: 
... it is obviously necessary on many grounds that all the citizens alike should take their 
turn of governing and being governed.  Equality consists in the same treatment of 
similar persons, and no government can stand which is not founded on justice.(Ibid., 
VII 14, b25-30).46   
So outlined here, the principle of citizenly equality grounds Aristotle’s argument in book IV of the 
Politics, that the best constitution for most states is one in which the middle classes (hoi mesoi) 
are in charge.  Citizens of the middle class, he there optimistically avers, being “equals and similars 
(cf. isōn kai homoiōn)”47 and possessing the goods of fortune (beauty, strength, and wealth) in 
moderation, are more likely than the very rich or the very poor to follow the rule of reason (logos) 
and to lead a life lying in the mean, as defined in the Nicomachean Ethics II 6-9.  
“Equal and similar” to his fellow citizens is precisely what the megalopsychos is not.  Being 
pre-eminent in virtue, nobility and wealth, he is capable of making a greater contribution to the 
community than most other citizens.  For that reason, the principle of distributive justice alluded 
to in Politics III 9 and 13 dictates that he should be given a proportionately larger share in the 
government of the city-state.  Rather than simply taking it in turn to rule and be ruled, the 
megalopsychos is qualified, on the ground of his overall excellence, to play a consistently 
dominant role in the realization of the function of the city-state.  When, later in book III, Aristotle 
returns to the question of the civic role best suited to the man - or men - of “pre-eminent excellence” 
(diapherōn kat’ aretēn), he answers as follows: 
If ... there be one person, or more than one, although not enough to make up the full 
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complement of a state, whose excellence is so pre-eminent that the excellence or the 
political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs, he or they 
can no longer be regarded as part of a state; for justice will not be done to the superior, 
if he is reckoned only as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in excellence 
and in political capacity .... For men of pre-eminent excellence there is no law – they 
are themselves a law. (III 13, 1284a4-14)48 
Rather than prevent such exceptional men from being continuously active in government, Aristotle 
here claims that, in accordance with the principle of distributive justice: “the only alternative is 
that ... all should happily obey such a ruler, according to what seems to be the order of nature, and 
that men like him should be kings in their state for life.” (1284b12-14) While acknowledging the 
somewhat utopian character of such aristocratic, or monarchic, conception of the state, Aristotle, 
even so, presented it as preferable to all others, whenever circumstances were such as to permit its 
implementation.49  The famous formula “excellence furnished with external means”50 neatly 
encapsulates the requirements for holding high office in the kind of aristocratic regime he favored.  
That the megalopsychos described in N.E. IV 3 meets these requirements is beyond doubt.  As 
Robinson’s aptly notes in an ad loc. comment to the above-quoted lines: “Aristotle did worship, 
or at least look up to with awed respect, some ideally highminded or ‘megalopsychic’ person who 
‘demands great honors and deserves them.’”51   
To be sure, such aristocratic model of the constitution, according to which those who are pre-
eminent in virtue and contribute most to the city deserve a proportionately large share in 
government, is not easily reconciled with the egalitarian model, according to which citizens of the 
middle class (hoi mesoi) should take it in turn to rule and be ruled.52  Fortunately, however, since 
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the present context does not require that an attempt be made at reconciling the two models, we can 
turn without further ado to Aristotle’s conception of civic friendship.  Which role, we shall now 
ask, can citizenly cooperation and concord, be it in an aristocratic or a democratic state, play in the 
life of a man who combines great wealth and supreme moral excellence? 
c. Civic friendship 
In Politics III 9, 1280b33-40, as quoted above, Aristotle assigns to friendship, pithily defined as 
voluntary living together, a central role at every stage in the formation of the city-state.  At the 
level of restricted associations within the polis, as he explains in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
friendship bonds individuals in the pursuit of common aims:  
Men address as friends their fellow travelers on a voyage, their fellow soldiers, and 
similarly also those who are associated with them in other kinds of communities.  
Friendship is present to the extent that men share something in common, for that is 
also the extent to which they share a view of what is just. (N.E., VIII 9, 1159b27-31) 
In so far as such restricted associations are aimed at advantage, they readily fall under the category 
of friendship of utility.  As such, one presumes, they do not outlive the realization of the particular 
common aim for which they were set up.  Yet, in spite of their limited scope and life-span, they do 
contribute, albeit modestly, to the fulfillment of the end of the city-state, namely to ensure citizenly 
cooperation in the pursuit of specific aims.   
In the formation of the polis itself, considerations of need and mutual advantage also play a 
crucial role.  Civic friendship, Aristotle tells us in the Eudemian Ethics, is based on utility and can 
even be compared to a “cash-in-hand transaction”53 since those who first set up the city had entered 
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into a “definite agreement” (cf. kath’ homologian)54 to assist each other and to further their 
common interests.  In book VIII of the Nicomachean version, too, Aristotle includes the polis itself 
among the associations entered in for the sake of advantage:  
All communities are like part of the political community.  Men combine with an eye 
to some advantage or to provide some of the necessities of life, and we think of the 
political community as having initially (ex archēs) come together and as enduring to 
secure the advantage [of its members]. (N.E., VIII 9, 1160a8-12)  
If, in the manner of Aristotle in these two passages, one concentrates on the motives behind the 
formation of the city-state, civic friendship cannot but be classified as a variety of the friendship 
of utility, a friendship which can vary in scope and duration depending on the character of the 
persons who come together.55  To the extent that those who associate for reasons of advantage 
expect to receive benefits proportional to their outlay,56 the basis of their friendship is equality of 
advantage gained or hoped for. 
However, as Aristotle takes care to stress in book nine of the Nicomachean version, a state 
cannot become, or remain, a flourishing community, as opposed to a mere association of men and 
women banded together for survival, unless the friendship which binds the citizens evolves in 
depth as well as in scope.57  Not only should it come to encompass the present as well as the long 
term interest of the state, but it should also aim at the moral and intellectual fulfillment of the 
citizens.  To this nobler bond, Aristotle gave the name of “concord” (homonoia):  
We do attribute concord to states, when the citizens have the same judgment about 
their common interest, when they choose the same things, and when they execute what 
they have decided in common. In other words, concord is found in the realm of action, 
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and in the realm of action in matters of importance and in those matters in which it is 
possible for both partners or all partners to attain their goals. (N.E. IX 6, 1167a26-30) 
So conceived, civic friendship transcends mere utility and can flourish only in states with a sound 
constitution.58  It flourishes, paradigmatically, in states run along the aristocratic model, when 
“both the common people (ho dēmos) and the better classes (hoi epieikeis) wish that the best men 
(hoi aristoi) should rule.”59  In such a case citizenly concord consists in the recognition, on the 
part of the majority, of the moral and political superiority of a small minority among them.  
Unequal and hierarchical, such civic friendship involves gratitude and deference on the part of the 
inferior and good government on the part of the superior.  The benefits conferred on to the citizen 
body as a whole by the aristoi in the city, who include the megalopsychoi, considerably outweigh 
the return they get from their fellow citizens.  While the majority get the internal good of living in 
a city-state that is well run and dedicated to the pursuit of “a happy and honorable life,” the aristoi 
in charge of public affairs gain nothing better in return than the external good of public recognition.  
Such external good, as Aristotle wryly notes in IV 3, 1124a5-9, gives them only a moderate amount 
of pleasure since honor is no match for moral excellence and political ability.  
Modern readers will be reassured to learn that Aristotle did not restrict the disinterested kind of 
civic friendship to aristocratic constitutions.  Having stated that it can prevail among good men of 
sound judgment, who are “of the same mind each with himself and all with one another” and who, 
in addition, wish “for what is just,” he concluded that it could bond also those who are equal in 
both virtue and citizenly status.60  As such, it can fit the democratic model of the constitution, in 
which the citizens take it in turn to rule and be ruled.61  In such a democratic constitution, 
committed as it is to the principle that “political society exists for the sake of noble actions,”62 the 
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megalopsychos, although not consistently occupying the high political offices of the state, would 
nonetheless have considerable opportunities to make a disinterested contribution to the end (telos) 
of the state.  Not only would he entertain relations of civic concord with other good men and 
citizens and, in association with them, promote justice, but his wealth would also enable him to 
bestow munificent gifts on the city.  Lastly, in extreme circumstances, his “all-complete” (pantelēs) 
virtue63 would prompt him to perform noble actions, not indeed for the sake of his own advantage, 
but to benefit both his personal friends and his fellow citizens.  Let us now turn to the crucial lines 
in which Aristotle outlines how far his paragon of virtue would go in benefiting city and friends, 
be it in an aristocratic or a democratic constitution.  
d. The megalopsychos as friend 
Take, to begin with, benefits of a financial nature.  A megalopsychos could be relied upon to 
perform high-profile public services or “liturgies” (leitourgiai), all of which entail heavy financial 
liabilities, such as equipping a trireme or financing the cost of a chorus for one of the dramatic 
festivals.  The importance of such contributions to the life of the city-state is not to be 
underestimated.  Since there was no overall regulated system of direct taxation in Classical Athens, 
the liturgies provided a large part of the public revenue needed by the city to maintain its fleet and 
public buildings as well as to provide for the regular scheduling of religious and dramatic festivals.  
So very considerable was the financial burden entailed by liturgies that many rich citizens sought 
exemptions from them or looked for loopholes in the regulations governing the institution.64  Some 
even resorted to various expedients of doubtful legality to hide their wealth.  Not so the 
megalopsychos.  From the repeated references in both versions of the Ethics to the public honors 
bestowed upon him by the city on account of services rendered, it can safely be inferred that a 
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megalopsychos would be highly unlikely to shirk his responsibilities as a potential liturgist.   
Financial contributions are not, however, the only sacrifice that an Aristotelian megalopsychos 
would consent to make for his city.  Far from it.  I shall now argue, on the basis of chapter eight of 
book IX of the Nicomachean version, that the megalopsychos, although no “lover of danger” (oude 
philokindunos, N.E., IV 3, 1124b7), would nevertheless be prepared, if the need arose, to lay down 
his life “for his friends and for his native land”.   
In N.E., IX 8 Aristotle mounts an intricate and highly compact argument to show that virtuous 
friendship is best understood by reference to self-love (philautia) properly so-called, which is the 
love of the highest and most sovereign element in oneself, namely reason.  This kind of self-love, 
Aristotle contrasts with self-love the misnomer, which seeks the gratification of the lower appetites 
and impulses.  While self-lovers of the first kind promote their reason by following its counsel in 
all things, self-lovers of the second kind seek mostly pleasure, comfort and personal safety.  The 
difference between the two kinds of self-love is highly relevant to the present issue.  Self-love 
directed at the promotion of one’s own reason tends not to produce inter-personal conflicts in so 
far as the demands of one person’s reason are unlikely to conflict with the demands of another 
person’s reason.  By contrast, self-love conceived as the gratification of appetitive wants and needs 
is very likely to result in inter-personal conflicts whenever, as often happens, the desired good is 
in such limited supply that one person’s having more of it entails another person’s having less. 
While rationality cannot be an object of competition, money and honors tend to be eagerly sought 
and fiercely fought over.  
In Aristotle’s viewpoint, therefore, a self-lover of the first kind will not let considerations of 
personal safety or comfort stand in the way of what he understands to be the demands of the 
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situation he finds himself in.  Far from considering personal risk to be of any great moment, he 
will readily sacrifice his comfort or safety to assist his friends or his native land, whenever either 
would benefit from his assistance.  In some admittedly exceptional circumstances, he will even be 
prepared to lay down his life for them.   
At this point Aristotle’s argument begins to take the appearance of paradox.  Even when the 
virtuous self-lover consents to the ultimate sacrifice, so Aristotle avers, he still stands to benefit.  
The argument, which is consequentialist in nature, begins as follows:    
Those ... whose active devotion to noble actions is outstanding win the recognition and 
praise of all; and if all men were to compete for what is noble (hamillōmenōn pros to 
kalon) and put all their efforts into the performance of the noblest actions, all the needs 
of the community (cf. koinēi) will have been met, and each individual (cf. idiai) will 
have the greatest of goods, since that is what virtue is. (IX 9, 1169a 6-11) 
The paradox comes through a few lines later, when Aristotle contends that the beneficiaries of 
noble actions are not restricted to the agent’s philoi and city, but that the self-sacrificial agent, too, 
stands to benefit.  Even if he were to lose his life, he would gain the (internal) good of virtue and 
the (external) good of honor:  
It is also true that many actions of the man of high moral standards [ho epieikēs] are 
performed in the interest of his friends and of his country, and if need be, he will give 
his life for them.  He will freely give his money, honors, and, in short, all good things 
that men compete for, while he gains nobility (to kalon) for himself. (ibid., 1169a18-
22., tr., Oswald, modified)65 
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Aristotle is not unaware of the paradox involved in holding that self-sacrifice can be self-serving.  
As he knew well, the conventional view holds that heroes can benefit others only by sacrificing 
themselves.  But the conventional view, Aristotle here argues, takes account of only one side of 
the issue.  It fails to understand that the agent who offers himself in sacrifice secures for himself, 
albeit posthumously, the greatest of all goods, namely to kalon.  Appearances to the contrary 
notwithstanding, he concludes, the self-sacrificial agent is, in this case, a gainer as well as a loser, 
and what he gains is greater than what he loses. 
Who is the rare person whom Aristotle has here in mind?  Who is the “man of high moral 
standards” (ho epieikēs), whose devotion to noble actions is such that he faces death with 
equanimity?  From the context, we know that he is a man capable of the highest kind of friendship, 
namely the friendship of virtue.  My claim is that the megalopsychos is such a man.  Not only is 
Aristotle’s megalopsychos worthy of wearing “the crown of the virtues” but, from Aristotle’s 
description of his character, we can safely assume that he is capable of the highest of the three 
kinds of friendship distinguished in both Ethics.66  Indeed, far from presenting him as too self-
absorbed to engage in friendship at all, Aristotle writes of him that “he cannot adjust his life to 
another, except to a friend” (N.E., 1124b31-32).  Clearly, such a paragon of virtue, who is forever 
disinclined to accept benefits from others (ibid., 1124b9-11), would not want to cultivate the 
friendship of utility.  As for the friendship of pleasure, his general loftiness of purpose and 
demeanor would most likely make him despise it.  Since we had already been told earlier in the 
Nicomachean version that the megalopsychos “will face great risks, and in the midst of them he 
will not spare his life, aware that life at any cost is not worth having” (ibid. 1124b8-9),67 we are 
entitled to infer that he is the paradigmatic philautos who, as described in chapter eight of book 
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IX, is prepared to die for his friends or country.   
This may well seem to us an impossibly heroic ideal of friendship and civic engagement.  Not 
so in ancient Greece, where a short and heroic life was traditionally held to be nobler than a long 
and undistinguished existence.  This ideal, which we find already expressed in the Iliad,68 was still 
current at the Classical age, as testified by Isocrates’ panegyric of Evagoras, the deposed ruler of 
Salamis.   In that oration, likely to have been composed for political motives, the famous orator 
found it judicious to say that “... men of ambition and greatness of soul (cf. philotimous kai 
megalopsychous) not only are desirous of praise for such things, but prefer a glorious death to life, 
zealously seeking glory rather than existence, and doing all that lies in their power to leave behind 
a memory of themselves that shall never die.”69  Since the oration was composed in the mid-360’s, 
it is likely that Aristotle, who had arrived at Plato’s Academy in 367, either heard or read it.  What 
at any rate is certain is that the verbal parallels between the orator’s lines and the above-quoted 
passage from N.E. IX 8 show that the conception of the megalopsychos as a man capable of heroic 
acts for the sake of his friends or country was far from unfamiliar to Aristotle’s contemporaries.  
The honors they would readily bestow on the megalopsychoi amongst them are a reflection of that 
conception.70    
   
4. Mikropsychia 
Aristotle’s eulogy of megalopsychia has cast a shadow over his disparagement of mikropsychia.  
So exercised have medieval and modern commentators been about his presentation of 
megalopsychia as a virtuous mean that they have mostly left out of account, or misunderstood 
altogether, his description of mikropsychia as the corresponding vice of deficiency. This is 
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unfortunate in so far as a close reading of these passages would have given these commentators a 
further opportunity to appreciate the gap that separates the values of the ancients from those of 
later ages.  A more immediately relevant reason for paying attention to Aristotelian mikropsychia, 
however, is that it stands to confirm - or to invalidate - a conclusion drawn earlier in this chapter, 
namely that self-knowledge plays a crucial role in Aristotle’s conception of friendship at both the 
personal and the civic level.   
From the number of times that mikropsychia is mentioned in the Ethics, it is clear that Aristotle 
attaches significance to it.  However, since his various descriptions of it, besides being terse, do 
not appear to be entirely consonant with each other, at least at first sight, our first task must be to 
consider the passages in some detail.  I shall begin with the Nicomachean account, which sets out 
the issue more fully and more discursively than the corresponding Eudemian passage.  
In the Nicomachean Ethics, mikropsychia is first mentioned in the context of the broad 
taxonomical considerations offered in book II: 
As regard honor and dishonor the mean is megalopsychia, the excess what we might 
call vanity and the deficiency mikropsychia. (N.E. II 7, 1107b21-23, tr. Ostwald, 
modified)  
In book IV, embedded in the chapter devoted to the megalopsychos, we find a highly compressed 
argument designed to show that the faults of the mikropsychos, like those of the vain man, are of 
a cognitive nature:  
Such then is the megalopsychos.  A man who falls short is a mikropsychos, and one 
who exceeds is vain.  Now here, too, these people are not considered to be evil - for 
they are not evil-doers - but only mistaken (hêmartêmenoi).  For a mikropsychos 
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deprives himself of the goods he deserves.  What seems to be bad (kakon) about him 
is due to the fact that he does not think he deserves good things and that he does not 
know himself (cf. agnoein heanton); if he did, he would desire them, especially since 
they are good.  Such people are not regarded as stupid so much as timorous (oknēroi).  
However, a reputation of this sort seems to make them even worse (cheirous).  For 
while everyone (cf. hekastoi) strives to get what they deserve, these people keep aloof 
from noble actions and pursuits (aphistantai tōn praxeōn tōn kalōn kai tōn 
epitēdeumatōn) and from external goods as well, because they consider themselves 
unworthy (anaxioi) ... Mikropsychia is more opposed to megalopsychia than vanity is, 
for it occurs more frequently and is worse.  (Ibid., IV 3, 1125a16-34, tr. Ostwald, 
modified) 
As characterized in these lines, the mikropsychos is someone whose desires and ambitions are 
more modest than they should be and whose achievements, as a result, fall short of the highest.  
Failing to know the extent of his capabilities, he stands back from the internal good of performing 
noble deeds and engaging in fine pursuits.  Such diffidence, in turn, makes it impossible for him 
to serve the city in ways that would make him worthy of receiving from the city the external good 
of honor (timē).  Although he cannot be said to be “evil”, there is nonetheless something bad about 
him’ since, in Aristotle’s estimation, there is nothing meritorious in seeking to obtain less than 
one’s capabilities would warrant.71    
In the more succinct Eudemian account there is no mention of fine actions or noble pursuits.  
The focus is firmly placed on the external good of timē, micropsychia being there described as a 
culpable (cf. psektos)72 failure to lay claim to goods which lie within one’s reach and to which one 
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is entitled: 
The vice that pertains to one who is worthy of great things without deeming himself to 
be is weak-heartedness (mikropsychia), since it seems to be the mark of the weak-
hearted person to fail to deem oneself worthy of anything great despite the availability 
of that which would render the claim just. (E.E., III 5, 1233a12-15, tr. Inwood and 
Woolf) 
What are the qualities that the mikropsychos fail to recognize in himself?  As we learn by 
implication later in the same chapter, they are mostly contingent qualities relating to legal status 
and social rank:    
... it would not be called weak-hearted (mikropsychos) if a resident alien did not deem 
himself worthy of high office but held back, whereas it would be in the case of a well-
born citizen who considered high office a great thing. (Ibid, 1233a28-30, tr. Inwood 
and Woolf)  
This is the point at which we must take care not to project our own values on to Aristotle’s text.  
Two mistakes in particular are to be avoided.  First, before deploring Aristotle’s “elitism” or 
superficiality in his choice of criteria of civic worthiness, we should bear in mind that the 
conception of civic culture in Classical Athens differed from our own in a number of respects.  
Although it was not impossible for resident aliens, slaves and low-born citizens to achieve wealth 
and renown, civic obligations and privileges were mostly in the hands of those who, descended 
from citizens, were of high rank and possessed large estates.  These were the citizens who were 
expected to contribute the most, financially as well as personally, to the city’s renown and 
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prosperity.  As shown in section three above, in the absence of any comprehensive system of direct 
taxation, the civic obligations that went with wealth and rank were as onerous as the rewards for 
fulfilling them were considerable.  Properly understood timē, therefore, was considered to be part 
and parcel of the performance of fine actions and noble deeds.  Accordingly, to be the object of the 
highest civic honors was, for most citizens, a matter of legitimate pride.  Correspondingly, citizens 
who, though high-born and wealthy, avoided getting involved in costly or risky civic endeavors 
would be rebuked and shamed for their lack of public spiritedness. Their reluctance to seek such 
public esteem as normally rewarded the holding of high office or the bestowal of munificent gifts 
on to the city would be regarded, not indeed as commendable reticence, but as culpable reticence.  
In describing the vice of mikropsychia as he does in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle, therefore, 
expresses commonly held opinions (endoxa) as well as his own view.    
Secondly and more importantly, mikropsychia is not to be thought of as the Classical Greek 
counterpart of humility.  To conflate, in the manner of many a later commentator, Aristotelian 
mikropsychia, defined as reticence to lay claim to goods of which one is worthy, and humility, 
defined as a propensity to value others above oneself,73 is to make Aristotle’s position well nigh 
unintelligible.  Aristotle’s position, I shall now argue, becomes clear once it is appreciated that his 
reasons for castigating the mikropsychos are the converse of his reasons for praising the 
megalopsychos and that both sets of reasons flow directly from his conception of civic worthiness 
and friendship.  Once this is understood, the gap between his values and ours, although 
considerable, will no longer seem unbridgeable.     
The blameworthy mikropsychos of Aristotle’s description is a person who combines external 
assets such as status, wealth and leisure with other, less contingent, qualities such as physical 
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strength, natural authority and political intelligence.  Although such a person cannot be assumed 
to be unaware of his lineage and the extent of his wealth, he yet fails to take the full measure of 
his capabilities and advantages , so reluctant is he to take on the civic onus that they place upon 
him.  Such failure, together with the resulting discrepancy between what he could do and what he 
actually does for the city is precisely what Aristotle blames the mikropsychos for.  So much is 
confirmed by his description in both versions of the Ethics of another character, the man of limited 
abilities and small achievements, who, keenly aware of his limitations, refrains from attempting to 
do great things and seeking high honors.  Although Aristotle is not greatly interested in this 
lackluster character, who is in no position to contribute significantly to the life of his city, he yet 
expresses esteem for him, and if the praise he gives him is faint, as one would expect, it is praise 
nonetheless.  To the extent that this man knows himself, so Aristotle contends, he resembles the 
megalopsychos, and his character is “as reason bids” (E.E., 1233a23); in spite of his small worth, 
he deserves to be called “sophrōn” (N.E., 1123b5).  
This is more than can be said of the mikropsychos who, content to remain unaware of his 
capabilities,74 harms the city by default.  Just how much harm Aristotle considers him to inflict 
upon the city emerges from his claim, as put forward in the Nicomachean version, that 
mikropsychia is “more opposed to megalopsychia than vanity (chaunotēs) is, for it occurs more 
frequently and is worse (cheiron).”75  To modern readers, this appears to be one more bemusing 
statement in a chapter that abounds in them.  How, these readers wonder, could Aristotle believe 
that the tendency to under-assess one’s merits is worse than the tendency to over-assess them?  
How, for that matter, could he flout the experience of everyday life by presenting the first tendency 
as more widespread than the second?   
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The fact that Aristotle made no attempt to justify either claim shows that he did not expect his 
contemporaries to find them contentious.  In an attempt to understand how Aristotle’s 
contemporaries would have received them, let me first elaborate somewhat on Aristotle’s terse 
presentation of the mikropsychos as deficient in the very respects in with the megalopsychos excels.  
The mikropsychos, like the megalopsychos, has been blessed with the “goods of fortune,” but, 
unlike him, he does not appreciate the moral onus that such goods place upon him.  While the 
megalopsychos, who judges great and small goods at their true value, does not hesitate to shoulder 
the expenses of liturgies, for example, the mikropsychos takes advantage of legal loopholes to 
avoid incurring the financial responsibilities involved, in the mistaken belief that private wealth is 
a greater good than civic engagement.  While the megalopsychos, who cares little for the opinions 
of the many and is open in love as in hate, speaks up in the Assembly and the law courts, even 
when it is dangerous to do so, the mikropsychos, who would do anything for a quiet life, is ever 
reluctant to stand and be counted.  While the megalopsychos, who does not think life worth 
preserving at all costs, is prepared to lay down his life for his friends and country, the mikropsychos 
consistently chooses the good of personal safety over that of performing “noble actions” likely to 
put life and limb at risk.  While the kalon is the ultimate good for the megalopsychos, it holds no 
motivating force for the mikropsychos.  While the megalopsychos accepts graciously whatever 
honors the city bestows upon him for services rendered, the mikropsychos purposefully eschews 
honors in the mistaken belief that most of them cost too much.  All in all, the differences between 
the two men stem from the fact that while the one effortlessly follows the guidance of his thinking 
element, which advises him that a life of safety is not the ultimate good, the other, who lacks an 
understanding of what befits a man of substance, aims at an easeful existence in the course of 
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which his needs and wants will be met.  To put the same point differently: both men aim at the 
good, but while the good of the megalopsychos is the real good, the good of the mikropsychos is 
only what appears to him to be the good.76       
Can we find confirmation in the text that this comparison is in line with Aristotle’s thinking on 
mikropsychia?  A first encouraging piece of evidence comes from his use of oknēros to describe 
the man who, through self-ignorance, turns away (aposterei) from the great goods that he can, and 
should, aspire to and who becomes worse as a result (N.E., IV 3, 1125a24).  In classical and post-
classical Greek, oknēros and its cognate oknein most often connote timidity, reluctance and 
weakness.77  As for Aristotle’s own use of oknēros and oknein, it is unfailingly deprecatory.78  Thus 
in the Historia Animalium, he expresses the view that “in virtually all animals”, including human 
beings, the female of the species is “more afraid of action” (oknēroteron VIII.1 613b13, tr. D.M. 
Balme) than the male, while the male is “more courageous” (andreioteron, 613b16) than the 
female.  In the Politics, he writes that “in time of war the poor are apt to hang back (oknein) unless 
they are fed; when fed, they are willing enough to fight.” (IV.10, 1297b10-11, tr. Jowett/Barnes, 
modified).  This is consonant with Aristotle’s use of mikropsychos, again in the Politics, to refer to 
those who are too timorous to consider conspiring, even against a tyrant.79 Taken together, these 
passages show that Aristotle labels oknēroi those who show reluctance to perform the courageous 
or noble actions of which they are capable, but which are incompatible with their comfort or safety.  
Such usage, which highlights the pejorative connotations of mikropsychia, brings into vivid relief 
the disanalogies between mikropsychia and the commendable disposition of character that we call 
modesty or humility (in the secular sense), words that denote the disposition to refrain, mostly out 
of consideration for others, from putting oneself forward or boasting about one’s own capabilities 
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and achievements.  This latter disposition, Aristotle thought just as commendable as we do since, 
as we saw, he ascribes it to the megalopsychos.  What, by contrast, he called mikropsychia is best 
understood, therefore, as culpable timidity or, in Grant’s felicitous gloss, “want of spirit.”80 
Further confirmation that it is on grounds of civic disutility that Aristotle takes mikropsychia to 
be a vice comes from his contention that it is a worse vice than vanity.  To find a justification of 
what is, to our minds, a counter-intuitive claim, we must turn, in succession, to books II and IX of 
the Nicomachean version.  In II 8 (1108b35-1109a20), Aristotle expresses the view that some 
virtues present a greater similarity to one of their two extremes than to the other.  Whenever human 
nature has a greater propensity to one extreme than to the other, he there explains, we take this 
extreme to be more opposed to the mean of virtue, and therefore worse than the other extreme.  
For example, because human nature is more prone to cowardice than to recklessness, he argues, 
we take cowardice to be more opposed to the mean of courage, and therefore worse than 
recklessness.  The contention, as put forward in book IV, that mikropsychia is worse than vanity 
stems from a similar assumption.  Since human nature, in Aristotle’s viewpoint, is more prone to 
the kind of diffidence, or lack of spirit, that goes under the name of mikropsychia than to vanity, it 
must be regarded as a worse failing.  Admittedly, it is not entirely clear at this point whether 
Aristotle himself agrees with the view he is reporting.  The concluding sentence of the chapter, in 
which he switches from what “we describe” to “what is,” however, makes it plain that he shares 
the view that he is reporting:   
We describe (legomen) as more opposed to the mean those things toward which our 
tendency is stronger; and for that reason excess, manifested as self-indulgence (ousa 
hyperbolē), is more opposed (enantiōtera) to self-control than is its corresponding 
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deficiency. (Ibid., 1109a16-19, tr. Ostwald, modified)81      
By analogy, we may infer, mikropsychia is worse than vanity since human beings have a greater 
propensity to shy away from noble undertakings than to boast of having undertaken them.  Is 
Aristotle’s argument as convincing as it is cogent?  Not as it stands.  For, after all, the vain man 
and the “diffident” man are guilty of the same mistake, the mistake of taking their worth to be 
other than what it actually is.  And if the mistake is the same, why should Aristotle, who praises 
the megalopsychos above all for his self-knowledge, consider one kind of failure of self-knowledge 
to be morally worse than another?  To understand Aristotle’s position on the matter, we need to 
remind ourselves of the megalopsychos of his description, whose consciousness of his own worth, 
as shown in section 3(d) above, goes hand in hand with his willingness to benefit his friends, 
personal and/or civic.  Compared with this noble character, the mikropsychos is likely to fail his 
friends and country both through his erroneous assessment of what he can do and his craven desire 
to lead a quiet life.  His unwarranted diffidence leads him to shy away from all sorts of challenge, 
ranging from taking a leading part in a hazardous military expedition to holding the high offices 
to which his status and ability would suit him.  In the process, his diffidence grows and he becomes 
ever more reluctant to intervene in circumstances that call for decisive action or generous 
intervention.  He becomes a man who generally prefers to play safe.82  This downward spiral is the 
converse of the process of acquiring moral virtue.  Just as it is by performing courageous actions 
that one becomes courageous,83 it is by repeatedly refusing to run risks of all kinds on the ground 
of (assumed) personal inadequacy that one acquires, or re-enforces, the internal disposition of 
mikropsychia.  To that extent, mikropsychia is an invidious and cumulative condition from which 
the state as a whole stands to suffer.  To “shrink from rule,” as Aristotle puts the matter in the 
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Politics, “is an injury to the state.”84  By contrast, the vain man of Aristotle’s description is less 
potentially harmful.  Aping the manners and behaviour of the megalopsychos, his exaggerated 
view of his own ability leads him to undertake “honorable enterprises” (cf. tois entimois, N.E., IV 
3, 1125a29) which he is incapable of carrying through.  Fortunately, however, his ineptitude is 
soon discovered (cf. exelegchontai, ibid.) and he becomes a figure of fun.  To the extent that he is 
revealed to be more show than substance, he is rendered largely harmless, and is therefore unlikely 
to inflict serious harm onto others by undertaking ore than he is capable of carrying off.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Aristotle’s megalopsychos, I have argued here, is a much maligned character, having fallen victim 
to the anachronistic projections of later commentators who approached the Ethics through the 
prism of their own, often religiously based, assumptions.  A modicum of historical distance, and 
attention to the larger cultural context of fifth and fourth century BC Athens, should have alerted 
us to the radical shift in values that began to take place not long after Aristotle wrote the texts that 
have come down to us under the titles of Eudemian Ethics, Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.  
Viewed from the perspective of these treatises, the megalopsychos is best understood as an asset 
to any city-state with a sound constitution, although an aristocratic regime in which government is 
in the hands of the best among the citizens would give him the greatest opportunity for putting his 
overall excellence at the service of the polis.  To the polis he gives much, both of his wealth and 
his person, by consistently acting in such a way as to promote the end of political society, which, 
in Aristotle’s viewpoint, is the performance of noble actions and the realization of the good life for 
all the citizens.  To this end, the city must seek to achieve a high level of political and economic 
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self-sufficiency as well as to instill into all its citizens the values which will enable them to fulfill 
their potentialities as rational beings.  In the realization of these two aims, as we saw, the 
megalopsychos has a large part to play: not only is he in a position to contribute much to the 
material well-being of the city, but his political excellence makes him a suitable candidate for the 
highest offices.  In return for services rendered, the city bestows great honors upon him.  These 
honors he graciously accepts, in the knowledge that they are deserved and that the city has nothing 
greater than honor to give him.  No doubt, this makes him a proud man, but his pride, which is 
grounded in an accurate assessment of his worth and merit, is not inordinate, nor is it vested in 
inappropriate objects, nor is it accompanied by any kind of unseemly rebelliousness.  The pride of 
the megalopsychos, being focused on his consistent success in meeting standards that are both high 
and true, cannot without paradox be stigmatized as vicious.  This being so, it offers modern readers 
of Aristotle an opportunity to question, or enlarge, the concept of pride they are familiar with.  
Unlike the megalopsychos, the mikropsychos has mostly been neglected by commentators, 
some of whom have been content to describe him as “modest” or “humble.”  In leaving matters at 
that, they have failed to heed Aristotle’s classification of mikropsychia as vicious.  Neither modest 
nor humble, the Aristotelian mikropsychos is someone who, although blessed with the goods of 
fortune and natural ability, consistently shies away from public involvement.  Rather than putting 
his talents and assets at the service of the state, he chooses to lead a retiring life in the course of 
which he remains unconcerned with public affairs.  In his craven desire for safety and comfort, he 
fails to heed the counsel of reason; he lets lesser men come forward and take positions of high 
responsibility for which they have little or no talent, and who later claim civic rewards to which 
they would not otherwise be entitled.  So doing, the mikropsychos undermines the capacity of the 
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state to ensure that its citizens can lead the best possible human life.  The harm he inflicts on the 
community by refusing political office is all the greater since the optimal Aristotelian polis, being 
relatively compact, can ill afford to lose the services of those who are recognised as having 
potentialities for statesmanship: “if the citizens of a state are to judge and distribute offices 
according to merit, then they must know each other’s characters.”85   
Aristotle’s censure of the mikropsychos for his lack of responsible citizenship would, within a 
few years, be seemingly forgotten, having fallen on the deaf ears of Epicurus and his followers 
who sought to release themselves “from the prison of affairs and politics.”86  But Aristotle’s 
strictures would never be completely forgotten.  In the intervening centuries distant echoes of them 
would be heard, particularly in times of war or international crisis.  One such occasion occurred in 
1961, when the citizens of one of the largest states on the planet were urged to ask, not “what your 


























* I am grateful to Denis O’Brien for helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Malcolm Schofield 
for bringing home to me that Aristotle’s Politics is an even more complex text than I had 
realized.   
1   Except when otherwise indicated, all quotations from the Politics are in Jowett’s translation, as 
revised by Barnes on the basis of Dreizehnter’s 1970 edition. 
2  See G. Heylbut (160, 29-162,15) and Aspasius (tr. Konstan 2006: 1-4, 7-8).  Recent 
commentators who have addressed the issue of focal meaning include Owen (1960), Gauthier 
et Jolif (1970), Fortenbaugh (1975), Walker (1979) and Berti in Alberti and Sharples edd. 
(1999). 
3  See, e.g., Allan (1952), Madigan (1971), Kahn (1981), Millgram (1987), Schollmeier (1994) 
and Stern-Gillet (1995). 
4  The megalopsychia with which I am here concerned is the ethical virtue analysed in E.E., III.5 
and N.E., IV.3.  I shall therefore leave out of account both the terminological distinction that 
Aristotle draws in A.Post II, 97b15-25 and his description of the ordinary use of the concept in 
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Rhet. 1362b12 and 1388b3.    
5  N.E., VIII 1; see also Pol. II 4, 1262b7-9, as quoted earlier, and IV 11, 1295b23-25.  Unless 
otherwise flagged, all translations of the Nicomachean Ethics are in Ostwald’s translation 
(1962), with occasional modifications, flagged as such. 
6  N.E., IV 3, 1123b1-2; see also E.E., III 5, 1233a2-3. 
7  N.E., IV 3, 1124a1-3. 
8  For the Old Testament, see, e.g., Proverbs 21:4 and 16:5; for the Qur’an, see, e.g., 7.146 and 
16.23. 
9  Ross’ historical sense seems to have been temporarily deserted him when he so translates 
megalopsychia and writes in an ad loc. comment to N.E., IV 3, 1123a34: “‘Pride’ of course has 
not the etymological associations of megalopsychia, but seems in other respects the best 
translation.”  One wonders which “other respects” the great commentator had in mind.    
10  In his translation of the Rhetoric Freese renders megalopsychia alternately as “magnanimity” 
or “high-mindedness”. 
11  So Grant (1858) and Ostwald (1962). 
12  So Rackham (1935).  
13  So Crisp (2000), Sachs (2002) and Taylor (2006).     
14  So Inwood and Woolf (2013). 
15  E.E., III 5, 1232b39-1233a1. 
16  Thanks are due to John Dillon for drawing my attention to possible parallels between 
Aristotelian mikropsychia and low self-esteem in the modern sense of the word. 
17  So Irwin (1985). 
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18  So Ostwald (1962) and Taylor (2006). 
19  So Rackham (1952), Crisp (2000), and Sachs (2002). 
20  So Rowe and Broadie (2002). 
21 So Inwood and Woolf (2013). 
22  For an example of such projection, see, e.g., Curzer (1990) and E. Lavielle (1999).  
23  N.E., IV 3, 1124a1-2.  See also E.E. III 5, 1232a31-2.   
24  E.E., VIII 3, 1249a5-16. 
25  Ibid., VIII 3, 1249a7-8. 
26  Pol. VII 1, 1323b41-1324a2.     
27  See, e.g., Thucydides 2.45.2 (Pericles’ funeral oration), according to whom “the greatest glory 
of woman is not to slip beneath the level at which nature has pitched her.” (my tr.)  This cannot 
but exclude noble deeds for which a debt of public recognition might be appropriate.   
28  Politics, I 13.  
29  This particular category of individuals is explicitly excluded in E.E., IV 3, 1233a29-30. 
30  N.E., IV 3, 1124a26, tr. Ostwald, slightly modified.  See also Pol., III 9, 1280b33-40. 
31  See, e.g., Luke 12:35-48. 
32  So J. Burnet (1900:179) in an ad loc. comment on 1123b1 sqq.  
33  So H.H. Joachim (1951:125).  Let it be noted, however, that Joachim makes a point of expressly 
endorsing Aristotle’s view that claims should match deserts. 
34  Please note that I am not here arguing that all the characteristics that Aristotle ascribes to the 
megalopsychos are morally admirable.  His disdain for the many, for example, as expressed in 
N.E., IV 3, 1124b5-6, hardly seems morally justifiable, even within an Aristotelian perspective.  
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I cannot therefore fully agree with Michael Pakaluk’s (2004) otherwise convincing attempt at 
rehabilitating this much maligned character. The issue is discussed at some length in Stern-
Gillet (2012).  For an enlightening comparison between Aristotle’s views on self-knowledge 
and Kant’s, see Andrea Veltman’s article in the present volume.  
35  As Gauthier (1970: 290-91) claims.  
36  As Hardie (1978: 68), more justifiably in my view, contends. 
37  Aristotle is not entirely consistent in the matter since at 1169b1-10, in the course of a dialectical 
argument leading to the conclusion that “a happy man needs friends,” Aristotle writes that 
friends “are thought to be the greatest of external goods,” 1169b9-10.  However, the fact that 
Aristotle needs to rely on this particular endoxon (received opinion) as a premise to ground his 
own conclusion suggests that he shares it. 
38  E.E., III 5, 1232a39. 
39  Ibid., VII 12 and NE VIII 1, 1155a5-9 and IX 9. 
40  Pol., I 1, 1253a9 and I 2, 1256b21. 
41  Ibid., 1253a29-30; see also N.E., I 7, 1097b11.  
42  Pol., V 11, 1313b5-6 and 1313a41. The same point is made in Plato’s Symposium (Pausanias’s 
speech), 182c1-7.   
43  Ibid., VII 10, 13b5-25, where Aristotle justifies the practice mainly on grounds of its antiquity.    
44  Kraut (1997:110).   
45  Pol., I 2, 1253a2-3. 
46 See also I 12, 1259b4-6, I 7, 1255b20, II 2, 1261a34-b5, and III 13, 1283b.  Of the three 
Aristotelian models of the polis and citizenship discussed by Schofield (1999), this is the 
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rational model (103-106).    
47  Pol. IV 11, 1295b25-26.   
48  See also E.E., VII 10, 1241b36-37. 
49  As aptly noted by Paul Cartledge (2000: 162) “... when forced to choose between equality and 
hierarchy, Aristotle regularly went for hierarchy.” 
50  Pol. IV 2, 1289a33 and VII 1, 1323b41-1324a2. 
51  Robinson (1995:58; first ed. 1962). 
52  In Pericles’ funeral oration, Thucydides effected an equipoise between the two models: “Our 
constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the 
whole people.  When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the 
law; when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public 
responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which 
the man possesses.”  (History of the Peloponnesian War, II.37, tr. Warner).   
53  E.E. VII 9, 1242a22-27, 
54  Ibid., VII 10, 1242b35. 
55  As usefully pointed out in Cooper (1977). 
56  E.E., VII 10, 1242b32-33.  
57  As can be seen, there are considerable differences between the two versions of the Ethics on 
the categorization of civic friendship: while the Eudemian account is of a fundamentally self-
regarding relationship, the account given in book IX of the Nicomachean version is of a 
relationship that is indicative of the citizens’ virtue and can therefore be engaged in at varying 
degrees of depth.  For a detailed account of the differences between the two versions of the 
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Ethics, see Stern-Gillet (1995: 149-155) and, in a more developed form, Schofield (1999: 87-
91).  See also Leigh (2012).   
58  This puts me at odds with Schofield (213: 287-88), who claims that Aristotle “regards civic 
friendship as the social glue of mutual advantage between individuals who are personally 
acquainted, seeing it as exhibited above all in exchange and commerce.”  As the above-quoted 
lines make clear, citizens of states with a sound constitution do not have to be personally 
acquainted in order to cooperate in political and social matters of importance.  The matter is 
further dealt with in section 3(d) infra in which it is argued that an Aristotelian megalopsychos 
is prepared to go to great lengths in order to benefit his country or assist his fellow citizens, 
whether or not he is personally acquainted with them.      
59  N.E. IX 6, 1167a35-1137b1. 
60  In N.E. IX 6, 1167b5-6 and 9-10, Aristotle describes civic friendship as beyond the capability 
of bad men (hoi phauloi). 
61  See note 45 above. 
62  As quoted on p. XXX above. 
63  N.E., IV 3, 1124a7-8.   
64  For the rules and regulations governing the institution of liturgies, see Aristotle, Athenian 
Constitution, LXVI and LSVII.  For a detailed account of the institution and how it was 
implemented, see Gernet (1955).  For the cultural background of all these issues in the fifth 
and early fourth centuries, see Davies (1978, ch. VI).   
65  For a reconstruction and attempted justification of the argument, see Madigan (1992), Stern-
Gillet (1995: chapter 5, passim) and Pangle (1999: 191-96).  In N.E., V 9, 1136b20-22, Aristotle 
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makes a similar point when he explains that the good man (ho epieikēs), in taking less than his 
fair share, secures for himself a higher good, namely glory or to kalon.  
66  N.E., VIII 2 and 3; E.E., VII 2. 
67  See also N.E., X 7, 1177b16-17 and E.E. III 5, 1232b10-12.  According to Collins (1999: 140-
41), the megalopsychos’ disdain of external goods, which extends to life itself, accounts for his 
“willingness to forgo [his] own good in favor of the noble which is not [his] good.” While this 
is certainly a factor in his readiness to die for his country and philoi, it is not the sole one since, 
as Aristotle takes care to note, the megalopsychos’ willingness “to adjust his life ... to a friend” 
provides an additional and powerful motivation for the ultimate sacrifice.                   
68  See, e.g. Iliad, XVIII, 97-104, in which Achilles, after the death of Patroclus, counters his 
mother’s counsel of prudence by saying that he would rather die forthwith than abide “a useless 
burden to the earth.” 
69 Isocrates, Evagoras, 3, tr. Larue Van Hook.  See also Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian 
War, II 42. 
70  See also Rhetoric I 9, 1666b3-4.  As Hardie (1978: 73) well said: “... the great man earns honors 
by his active services to his friends and country in great matters.” 
71  N.E., IV 3, 1232b38-39. 
72  E.E., III 5, 1232b39-1233a1.  See also N.E., IV 3, 1125a18-27. 
73  The distinction between two kinds of humility, religious and secular, however interesting in 
itself, is not directly germane to the present issue.  Humility, as consistently praised by biblical 
authors (see, e.g., Matthew 19:30, Luke 1:52 and Paul, Philippians 2:3,) is awareness of our 
creaturely status; secular humility, on the other hand, is the disposition to place others above 
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oneself.  Aristotle would hardly have been able to make sense of the religious kind of humility.  
74  Contemporary philosophers of an existentialist persuasion might be tempted to describe 
mikropsychia as a form of self-deception, but Aristotle, who was the author of the distinction 
that these philosophers question, would not, of course, have done so.  
75  N.E., IV 3, 1125a32-34. 
76  The relevance of character to the choice of one’s good is brought out clearly in section I of 
Gary Gurtler’s contribution to this volume.   
77  See L.S.J, s.v. oknaleos and oknēros, I.2; Chantraine (1974).  Such evaluative divergences 
make translation a hazardous undertaking, and readers of ancient texts must avoid relying 
exclusively on the choice of words of even the best of translators. Ostwald’s rendering of 
oknēros as “retiring” and Irwin’s as “hesitant” both concede too much to modern assumptions 
in so far as the two adjectives lack the negative undertones that the words had in ancient Greek.  
78  Bonitz (1831), s.v. 
79  Pol., V 11, 1314a16. 
80  Grant (1858: ad. loc. comment on 1125a17). 
81  For particularly clear comments on those lines, see Broadie in Broadie and Rowe (2002: 309-
10). 
82  As also noted by Gauthier (1970: 297-98).  
83  As Aristotle claims in N.E., II 1, 1103b2. 
84Pol. IV 3, 1295b12.  
85  Pol., VII 4, 1326b15-16. 
86  Sententiae Vaticanae, fr. 58, tr. Bailey.  This particular aspect of Epicureanism is explored in 
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Harry Lesser’s contribution to the present volume.  J.F. Kennedy’s inaugural address, January 
20, 1961. 
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